Capacitygate

Government contractors deploying agents may need stronger controls than prompting a model to refuse disallowed actions. The supplied research confirms several open-source policy gateways that block tools, plus a government-focused protocol extension with audit logging and signatures. It also describes a proposed procurement clause with disclosure and incident-reporting requirements. The raw enforcement technology is therefore commoditizing; the product hypothesis is a maintained policy corpus and government operating wrapper, not a novel proxy.

Removing a tool from one gateway does not prove the agent has no other path to the same data or effect. Inventory completeness, identity, classification, session context, policy compilation and downstream enforcement all matter. A signed decision log can show artifact integrity, not policy correctness, complete coverage, compliant behavior or authorization to operate. The supplied clause had a comment period and must not be presented as final contract authority without current primary verification.

Authority source, contract clause, policy version, role and classification facts, capability inventory, compiled session set, tool request, gate decision, escalation, forwarded call, downstream receipt, external effect, signed log, incident finding and authorization decision are separate. Capacitygate should make policy enforcement deterministic and inspectable while leaving policy interpretation, system authorization, incident reporting and compliance conclusions with accountable government and contractor officials.

A security, compliance or authorization leader at a government contractor deploying agent workflows into controlled enterprise systems.