Mcpaegis
A static and isolated-dynamic security assessment service for authorized MCP servers that records the exact artifact, configuration, tests, observed behavior, limitations, remediation, retest, signature, and expiry while keeping control mappings and safety claims explicitly bounded.
The research confirms an open scanner with static and proxy modes, an isolated execution substrate, an open signing ecosystem, and NIST AI-agent control overlays still in development. It did not find a reviewed managed service joining continuous assessment, mappings, and signed publication. The input's named government-vulnerability framing is not independently substantiated in the supplied findings and requires primary verification. No structural incumbent copying cost is evidenced.
Mcpaegis cannot prove an MCP server safe, compliant, non-malicious, free of vulnerabilities, or suitable for production. Static analysis misses runtime behavior; detonation observes only the tested artifact, configuration, environment, fixtures, network policy, time, and paths. A control mapping is a reviewer aid, not evidence that a control is designed or operating effectively. A signature proves integrity and signer attribution, not result truth.
The publishable artifact should be a version-bound assessment card with scope, observed findings, severity method, evidence, coverage, untested surfaces, limitations, remediation, retest, expiry, and revocation—not an evergreen “safe” badge.
MCP server publishers, enterprise platform and security teams, registries, and procurement groups that need repeatable pre-connection evidence.
Rapid tool-server adoption and active security research make the need current.
Publishers and enterprise security teams have a clear pre-connection need.
Several security primitives and multiple connected ideas support the direction, though managed certification is not established.
A confirmed scanner, isolated execution and signing substrates, specific security buyer, dynamic test cases, reproducible findings, and expiring signed artifacts create a concrete managed wedge.
Coverage is intrinsically incomplete, dynamic execution is risky, exact government claims need validation, control overlays are in development, false confidence is dangerous, and competitors can copy.
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